Section 16.4 Anti-Piracy Measures and Best Management Practices (BMP)

1. Introduction: The Imperative of BMP for Bulk Carrier Safety

The specter of piracy and armed robbery against ships, while fluctuating in intensity across different regions, remains a persistent and serious threat to maritime operations. Bulk carriers, due to inherent characteristics such as potentially low freeboards when laden, slower operational speeds, and extensive deck areas, can be particularly attractive targets for pirates and armed robbers. Consequently, the diligent application of Best Management Practices (BMP) is not merely advisable but an operational necessity for any bulk carrier anticipating transit through or near designated High-Risk Areas (HRAs).

This section provides a focused overview of anti-piracy measures, drawing heavily from the latest iterations of BMP (e.g., BMP5 – always consult the most current version published by industry bodies). It emphasizes practical, actionable steps that ship operators, Masters, and crews of bulk carriers must undertake to deter attacks, protect personnel, and safeguard the vessel and its cargo.

2. Defining the Threat: Piracy, Armed Robbery, and High-Risk Areas

A clear understanding of the threat is foundational to effective defense:

Piracy: As defined under UNCLOS Article 101, piracy involves illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends by those on a private ship or aircraft, directed against another ship or aircraft on the high seas, or against persons/property thereon.

Armed Robbery Against Ships: Similar acts occurring within a State’s territorial waters, archipelagic waters, or internal waters.

High-Risk Areas (HRAs): These are geographically defined sea areas where intelligence indicates a significant risk of piracy or armed robbery. HRAs are subject to change based on current threat assessments. Masters and Company Security Officers (CSOs) must consult the latest advisories from organizations like UKMTO, MSCHOA, IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, and relevant Flag State or industry circulars (e.g., from BIMCO, INTERTANKO, ICS, OCIMF) to identify current HRAs and associated voluntary reporting schemes prior to any voyage. Examples have historically included parts of the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea, and certain areas in Southeast Asia.

3. Core Tenets of BMP: A Layered Defense Strategy

BMP advocates a multi-layered approach designed to deter, detect, delay, deny, and respond to threats. For bulk carriers, these principles must be practically applied considering their unique operational and design features.

3.1. Company and Voyage Planning: The Proactive Foundation

Effective anti-piracy preparedness begins ashore, long before the vessel approaches an HRA.

Company Security Policy & Voyage Risk Assessment:

The company must have a robust maritime security policy that explicitly addresses piracy and armed robbery, including guidance on BMP implementation, crew training, and the potential use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP).

A detailed, voyage-specific risk assessment is mandatory for any transit involving an HRA. This assessment must consider:

Current threat intelligence for the specific route.

Vessel characteristics: freeboard (laden/ballast), speed capabilities, maneuverability, deck layout, and cargo type.

Crew training levels and experience.

Existing vessel hardening measures and security equipment.

Contingency plans for various attack scenarios (e.g., attempted boarding, successful boarding, hostage situation).

Registration and Reporting Protocols:

Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA): Register the vessel’s transit details when entering the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) in the Indian Ocean region.

UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO): Provide regular position reports and incident reports to UKMTO when transiting its VRA. UKMTO acts as a vital link between merchant shipping and naval/military forces.

Regional Reporting Schemes: Comply with other regional reporting requirements, such as MDAT-GOG for the Gulf of Guinea.

Maintain contact lists for relevant authorities and company emergency contacts.

3.2. Vessel Hardening: Creating a More Difficult Target

Physical security measures aim to make it significantly harder for pirates to board and gain control. For bulk carriers, consider:

Perimeter Protection:

Razor Wire (Concertina Wire): Strategically deploy high-quality razor wire along railings, particularly in areas of low freeboard (e.g., main deck when laden, poop deck). Ensure it’s robustly secured to form a formidable barrier.

Physical Barriers: Utilize temporary or permanent fencing, and secure bulwark gates and other access points.

Anti-Climbing Measures: Apply non-slip paint or other anti-climbing devices on hull sides and around potential access points.

Access Control:

Secure all external doors and hatches providing access to accommodation, engine room, bridge, and other critical internal spaces. Use robust locks, deadbolts, and internal securing mechanisms.

Pay special attention to securing access from mooring decks and the stern.

Enhanced Surveillance and Detection:

Lighting: Maximize deck lighting during hours of darkness, illuminating the ship’s sides and vulnerable areas to deter clandestine approaches and aid visual detection.

CCTV: Ensure CCTV systems covering vulnerable areas are fully operational, with recording capability and clear views.

Deterrents:

Water Cannons/Fire Hoses: Prepare and test fire hoses and water monitors. Ensure they can be operated from protected positions and that crew are trained in their use as deterrents. For bulk carriers, consider the potential impact of water accumulation on deck stability and ensure scuppers are clear.

Protection of Critical Spaces: Reinforce doors and portholes to the bridge, engine control room, and accommodation where feasible, possibly with steel grilles or plates.

3.3. The Citadel: A Temporary Safe Haven

A citadel is a pre-planned, hardened area where crew can retreat in the event of a boarding, buying time for external intervention.

Designation and Fortification:

Choose a location that is difficult for pirates to access, ideally low in the vessel, without direct external windows/portholes (e.g., steering gear compartment, a dedicated secure store).

Reinforce access points from the inside.

Essential Provisions: The citadel must be equipped with:

Independent, secure two-way communication (e.g., satellite phone, spare VHF).

Emergency food and water for the crew for a specified duration.

First aid kits and any essential medications.

Sanitary facilities.

Emergency lighting and ventilation.

Copies of ship’s plans and emergency contact lists.

Drills: Conduct regular, realistic drills for mustering all crew into the citadel, ensuring the process is swift and all personnel understand their roles. Time these drills.

Limitations: Emphasize that a citadel is a temporary refuge. Its success relies on the vessel having reported the attack and the timely arrival of external assistance.

3.4. Crew Training, Awareness, and Vigilance: The Human Factor

The most sophisticated hardware is ineffective without a well-prepared crew.

Pre-Voyage Briefings: Conduct thorough briefings covering the specific threats of the upcoming voyage, the vessel’s security plan, individual responsibilities, and emergency procedures.

Anti-Piracy Drills: Regularly practice responses to various piracy scenarios, including:

Detection of suspicious craft.

Activation of alarms (general alarm, SSAS).

Use of deterrents.

Communication protocols.

Muster to the citadel.

Enhanced Watchkeeping:

Maintain an augmented 24/7 lookout in HRAs, utilizing all available means (visual, radar, thermal imagers if available).

Train lookouts to identify pirate tactics and suspicious indicators (e.g., skiffs operating in groups, mother ships, high-speed approaches, presence of ladders/weapons).

Security Awareness: Foster a high state of security consciousness among all crew members.

3.5. Transit Procedures within High-Risk Areas

Once in an HRA, heightened security posture is critical:

Maximize Speed: Maintain the maximum sustainable speed throughout the HRA transit. While bulk carriers may be slower, every knot counts.

Evasive Maneuvers: If a suspicious approach is detected and pirates are not yet aboard, execute pre-planned evasive maneuvers if safe and practicable, using large rudder angles to create difficult boarding conditions.

Communication Discipline:

Test SSAS and all emergency communication equipment before entering the HRA and regularly thereafter.

Maintain regular contact with the CSO and follow reporting protocols (UKMTO, MSCHOA, etc.).

Restricted Access: Enforce strict access control. All doors and hatches to internal spaces must be kept locked from the inside.

Minimize Deck Exposure: Limit crew activity on open decks. Essential work should be risk-assessed and conducted with appropriate security oversight.

AIS Policy: Generally, keep AIS transmitting to aid identification by friendly forces. Only alter AIS status based on specific guidance from military authorities or in extreme, documented circumstances where the Master believes it directly enhances immediate safety.

3.6. Actions During an Attack or Boarding

A calm, rehearsed response can save lives:

Raise the Alarm: Immediately activate the general alarm, sound the ship’s whistle, and use the PA system to alert all crew.

Report Immediately:

Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS).

Transmit a distress message (Mayday) on VHF Ch. 16 and/or via DSC.

Report the attack to UKMTO/MSCHOA, the CSO, and other relevant authorities, providing: vessel name, call sign, IMO number, position, nature of attack (attempted/boarded), number of pirates, weapons sighted, direction of approach/escape, any injuries.

Muster to Citadel (if pre-planned and safe): If boarding is imminent or confirmed, and it is part of the vessel’s plan, all non-essential personnel should proceed to the citadel. Ensure accountability.

Non-Confrontation: If pirates gain access to crew areas or the bridge before citadel muster is complete, or if crew are caught outside the citadel, they must not resist or confront the attackers. The priority is to avoid provoking violence. Comply with demands (where safety is not further compromised), remain calm, and avoid direct eye contact.

Engine Stop (if deemed safest): The Master may consider stopping the main engine if it is assessed that this action could prevent pirates from gaining full control of the vessel’s navigation or reduce risks to the crew, but this is a highly situational decision.

3.7. Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)

The employment of PCASP is a significant decision with legal, financial, and operational implications.

Risk-Based Decision: The decision should be based on a thorough company risk assessment.

Flag State Authorization: Ensure compliance with all Flag State laws and guidance regarding PCASP.

Littoral and Port State Regulations: Be aware of and comply with the regulations of coastal and port states concerning armed personnel onboard.

Reputable PMSCs: If using PCASP, select Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) that are properly vetted, insured, and adhere to international standards (e.g., ISO 28007).

Clear Rules for the Use of Force (RUF): Agreed-upon RUF, understood by the Master, CSO, and PCASP team leader, are essential. The Master retains ultimate command of the vessel.

Coordination: Establish clear protocols for communication, command, and control between the PCASP team and the ship’s crew.

3.8. Post-Incident Procedures

After an attack or suspicious event:

Crew Welfare: The immediate priority is the safety, medical treatment (if required), and psychological well-being of the crew. Arrange for post-traumatic stress counseling.

Reporting: Provide comprehensive reports to the Flag State, CSO, P&I Club, IMB PRC, and other relevant authorities.

Preserve Evidence: If safe, preserve any evidence left by attackers.

Debrief and Lessons Learned: Conduct a thorough debrief with the crew and company to analyze the incident, identify lessons, and refine security plans and BMP implementation.

3.9. Specific Bulk Carrier Vulnerabilities & Countermeasures – A Recap

Low Freeboard: Particularly when laden, this is a primary vulnerability. Counter with robust physical barriers (razor wire, fencing) and vigilant lookouts.

Slower Speed: Limits ability to outrun pirates. Emphasizes early detection, deterrents, and vessel hardening.

Large Deck Areas: Can offer multiple boarding points and cover for attackers. Requires comprehensive barrier strategy and effective surveillance.

Mooring Stations (Fore and Aft): Often targeted. Ensure they are well-secured and included in hardening plans.

3.10. The Critical Role of Information Sharing

Prompt and detailed reporting of all piracy-related incidents (even suspicious approaches that do not escalate) is vital for:

Warning other vessels in the area.

Facilitating response by naval and law enforcement assets.

Maintaining an accurate global and regional threat picture.

Informing updates to BMP and other security guidance.

4. Conclusion: Sustained Vigilance and Adaptation

Effective anti-piracy defense for bulk carriers hinges on a dynamic, multi-layered strategy rooted in the consistent application of Best Management Practices. This involves diligent pre-voyage planning and risk assessment by the company, robust physical hardening of the vessel, comprehensive crew training and drills, heightened vigilance during transit, and clearly defined emergency response procedures. The threat landscape is ever-evolving; therefore, CSOs, Masters, and crews must remain committed to continuous improvement, regularly reviewing their security plans against the latest intelligence and industry guidance to ensure the highest possible level of preparedness when navigating the world’s oceans.